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I. Introduction
Comparisons of the behavior of macroeconomic time series before and after a major regime
change provide particularly valuable evidence on the effects of alternative monetary policies. The
year 1914 provides a dramatic example of such a change in regime.
From one point of view, the monetary regime is defined by the stochastic process jointly
generating money, prices, and nominal interest rates (and perhaps other macroeconomic variables
as well). Shiller (1980), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Miron (1986), Mankiw, Miron, and Weil
(1987), and others1 document that the stochastic behavior of United States nominal interest rates
changed sharply in 1914.2 Seasonals and other forms of predictable transitory variation in short
term nominal rates, which had previously been a prominent feature of the data, almost completely
disappeared, leaving short rates nearly a random walk. Clark (1986) finds that the disappearance of
seasonality was not confined to the United States but rather occurred worldwide.3 Shiller and Siegel
(1977) and Barsky (1987) suggest that the stochastic behavior of inflation underwent a significant
metamorphosis at about the same time. While inflation in both the United States and Britain was
approximately white noise from the earliest available data through 1913, the inflation processes
show moderate but non-negligible persistence after 1914.
From an institutional point of view, the change in monetary regime in 1914 was equally notable.
The outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1914 was accompanied by the suspension of specie
payments in many countries - a shock from which the international gold standard never fully
recovered. In November, the Federal Reserve began operations, fulfilling the charter set out for
it by legislation from the previous December. Though England, Germany, and France had long
histories of central banking, the United States had not had a central bank since 1836.
The topic of this paper is the relationship between the changes in monetary institutions sur-
rounding 1914 and the discontinuity in the stochastic behavior of interest rates and prices. More
specifically, we ask a key question that bears on the role of the economic policy regime in determin-
ing the behavior of macroeconomic and financial variables: which of the institutional shocks bears
the primary responsibility for the observed changes in the statistical relationships? Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), Shiller (1980), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Miron (1986), and Mankiw, Miron, and
1 See also Glass (1927), Macauley (1938), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Canova (1986) and Barro (1987).
2 Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), using a switching regression technique, narrow the likely date of the change
in the stochastic process of the nominal rate to the interval between December 1914 and March 1915. They also
show that the behavior of the term structure at the short end of the yield curve changed more or less concurrently
in a way consistent with the qualitative predictions of the expectations theory of the term structure.
* Morgenstern (1959) makes the same point.
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Weil (1987), all focusing on the United States, attribute the "smoothing" of interest rates to the
founding of the Federal Reserve, which, after all, was established in considerable part with this end
in mind. Clark (1986), however, challenges this view with an argument that appears compelling
prima facie. le notes that the disappearance of seasonal fluctuations in nominal interest rates was
a worldwide phenomenon. Although the United States was by 1914 certainly not a small country,
neither was it so-dominant that it should have been able, acting on its own, to alter greatly the
stochastic processes of world prices and interest rates. Instead, Clark suggests, it would appear
more plausible .to attribute the altered behavior of nominal interest rates to the dissolution of the
worldwide gold standard at the start of World War I. A Serious examination of these competing
hypotheses is the goal of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide soime historical background, placing
the institutional developments - the founding of the Fed, possible interactions between the various
central banks, war, suspensions and resumptions of specie payments - in perspective. In Section
III we characterize the stochastic behavior of nominal interest Tates and inflation rates before and
after 1914 for the United States and Britain. We obtain a sharp characterization of the change in
the nominal rate processes: an almost complete disappearance of forecastable variation, including
seasonality, in nominal rates for both countries. We also find some indication of change in the
inflation process: the emergence of positive serial correlation where inflation had previously been
closer to white noise.
Section IV of the paper considers the a priori plausibility of the hypothesis that the founding of
the Fed was an important factor in stabilizing interest rates after 1914, given the relatively modest
size of the United States in international trade and finance. We propose that policy interaction in a
many country game might provide the missing link. We present an example in which interest rate
stabilization, though desired by each central bank, occurs oily if all countries have central banks.
In our example this follows because countries pursuing interest rate stabilization alone experience
undesirable gold flows. The model suggests that the founding of the Fed might have been important
because it marked the beginning of a new era in which all major countries had a central bank.
Section V presents a number of pieces of evidence bearing on role of the Fed versus the role
of the gold standard in contributing to the changes in the stochastic behavior of interest rates and
prices.4 We first examine the switch from fixed to flexible rates 'at the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system. We find that it was not accompanied by the same kinds of changes in interest rate
4 We also discuss briefly the hypothesis that World War I per se wa~s responsible for the change in regime.
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behavior that occured in 1914, which casts doubt on the destruction of the gold standard as the
principal cause of the change in the stochastic processes for interest rates in 1914. Our second piece
of evidence comes from examining the correlations across countries of both interest rates and price
levels. We find that the changes in these correlations after 1914 were modest at best, and they
do not appear to move in the direction implied by a simple shift from fixed to flexible rates. This
evidence therefore also suggests that the introduction of the Fed was an important factor in the
1914 change in regime.
In Section VI we present a rather qualified evaluation of the likelihood that the stabilization
of the nominal interest process was unaccompanied by an alteration of the real rate process, an
assumption of the theory of interest rate targeting in Barro (1987). In particular, we examine
whether the smoothing of the seasonal in nominal rates in the second regime reflected a smoothing
of the seasonal in real rates. We wish to evaluate Shiller's (1980) suggestion that the seasonality
that was removed from the nominal rate may have reappeared in prices and thus was not purged
from the real rate. We use a different interest rates series, different statistical techniques, as well as
data for an additional country to address this question. Unfortunately, the data exhibit less power
to judge this issue than we had hoped. The volatitility of inflation during both subperiods leads
to the finding of very large standard errors for the estimated seasonal pattern in real rates, so we
confirm Shiller's conclusion that "we can't say with any confidence whether a policy of eliminating
the seasonal pattern in nominal rates reduced the seasonal pattern in real rates."
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Historical Overview
The period from 1879 to 1914 stands out in the history of world monetary systems as the time
when the world came closest to operating on a textbook version of the gold standard. The period
is also unusual, although not unique, in that the United States was the only major economic power
that did not possess a central bank. The period after 1914 differed drastically from the period
before 1914 in several respects. As a result of World War I, the international gold standard was
suspended in most countries, and it returned for only a limited time and in much weakened form.
The Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914, providing the United States with centralized
monetary control for the first time in almost eighty years.5 We analyze in Sections IV and V the
* A variety of institutions, including the United States Treasury and the New York Clearing House, had performed
limited central banking functions at times during the National Banking Period. On the role of the Treasury,
see Andrew (1907) and Timberlake (1963,1978). On the New York Clearing House, see Timberlake (1984).
3
likelihood that one or both of these institutional changes caused the changes in finanical markets
that occurred at the same time. In this section we review the major historical events connected
with the changes in institutions.
A. Central Banking Before 1914
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most of the important economic powers other
than the United States had established central banks. These banks included the Bank of England,
established in 1694, the Bank of France (1800), the State Bank of Russia (1860), the German
Reichsbank (1876), and the Bank of Japan (1882).6 Some of these banks were closer to ordinary
(state sanctioned) commerical banks than to modern central banks, and none of them engaged in
what would today be considered a complete set of central banking activities. The Bank of England
was the most developed of these central banks in terms of exercising central banking functions, and
it was widely regarded as playing a central role in enforcing the international gold standard.7
It was universally recognized during this period that the crucial objective of central banks was
to maintain a supply of gold reserves sufficient to insure convertibility (Bloomfield (1959), p.23).
Central banks accomplished this task through a number of different means, the most important of
which was the manipulation of the interest rate at which they would discount private debt. Other
methods for safeguarding the gold reserve included open market operations and changes in the
regulations regarding convertibility. The Bank of England relied heavily on changes in the discount
rate (Bank Rate), while the continental central banks made more frequent use of other methods
(Eichengreen (1985), p.13).
Contemporary discussions about how the Bank of England should set Bank Rate indicate
the objectives that pre-1914 central banks pursued when they were not handcuffed by the need
to insure convertibility. Sayers (1936) states that the Bank gave weight to the condition of the
domestic economy; specifically, the Bank anticipated the effects of future events on interest rates
and attempted to set Bank Rate at the level it expected to maintain. The First Interim Report of
the Cunliffe Committee (1918) suggested that Bank Rate be raised in response to permanent but
not temporary disturbances in the money market. Jevons (1884) argued that the Bank should not
raise the Bank Rate in response to the regular autumnal drains on the Bank's reserves since these
replenished themselves in the normal course of business. Bagehot claims in Lombard Street (1873)
6 Bloomfield (1959) counts central banks or quasi-central banks in an additional sixteen countries as of 1880, as
well as three more by 1907.
7 See Bordo and Schwartz (1984), Eichengreen (1985), and the references therein for discussion of this point.
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that the Bank had an "inescapable duty" to act as lender of last resort. Whatever the objectives of
the world's central banks, they were either very skillful or very lucky in maintaining convertilbity
since the period was marked by few exchange crises (Bloomfield (1959), p.9).
The United States stood out from the other economic powers of this period in lacking a
central bank until the founding of the Federal Reserve System in November of 1914. The events
precipitating the founding of the Fed started with the Panic of 1907, which led to the passage
of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, a temporary measure designed to allow New York City Banks some
leeway in dealing with emergencies, and to the creation of the National Monetary Commission,
a congressional and academic committee that undertook to study all aspects of the domestic and
international banking system. The Commission's Report, published in 1910, laid the basic blueprint
for the Federal Reserve Act, which became law in December of 1913. The heads of the twelve banks
met in August of 1914 to discuss the details of the system's organization, and the banks opened
for business in November of that year.
The Fed was created mainly to eliminate dramatic interest rate fluctuations through provision
of an "elastic currency" (Laughlin (1912), Willis (1915), Glass (1927), Warburg (1930)). There
were, of course, other central banking activities that the Fed was expected to perform, particularly
the elimination of interregional interest rate differentials and the associated pyramiding of reserves
(Gendreau (1979, 1983), White (1983)). The Fed's crucial objective, however, was the accomodation
of the regular seasonal fluctuations in money markets as well as the sterilization of more erratic
interest rate fluctuations associated with finanical panics. It is useful to note that the Fed was
conceived and created before the outbreak of World War I and the suspension of the gold standard.
The founders of the Fed had no way of knowing that the Fed would find itself, almost precisely at
the moment of its birth, in a new kind of international monetary situation. Instead, they expected
that the Fed would operate under the gold standard regime that had come to be the accepted
system of international monetary arrangements (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), p.191).
B. The Gold Standard and World War I
The exact defintion of the gold standard varies considerably among different authors, and the
features of such a standard that are important depend on the question at hand. Our discussion
here focusses on those features of a gold standard that are crucial to determining the conditions
under which interest rates and prices are determined both within and across countries.
Eichengreen (1985) ascribes three basic characteristics to a classical gold standard: 1) convert-
ibility between domestic money and gold at a fixed official price; 2) freedom for private citizens
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to export and import gold; and 3) a set of rules relating the quantity of money in circulation to
that country's gold stock.8 The first two features imply that a gold standard establishes a system
of fixed exchange rates between national currencies. This places strong restrictions on the feasi-
ble monetary and fiscal policies available to any open economy operating under a gold standard
(Sargent (1986), pp.45-46).
Three different types of rules relating the quantity of fiat money to gold reserves were common
(Bloomfield (1959), p.18). Fiduciary systems required all notes above a certain limit to be backed
100 per cent by legal reserves. Proportional systems required notes to be covered by a minimum
proportion of legal reserves. Combination systems involved aspects of both systems. If a central
bank (in a closed economy) operated under a fiduciary system and was not at the constraint, then
it could affect interest rates and the price level by altering the mix of notes relative to gold.
As mentioned above, the thirty-five year period preceding 1914 constituted the world's most
direct experience with a classical gold standard. All the major economic powers in Europe and Asia,
as well as the United States and most Latin American countries, maintained convertibility during
this period. There were only a few devaluations by countries operating on the gold standard, and
only a small number of economic powers participated in any other kind of monetary arrangement.9
The period is also noteworthy for the comparative absence of balance of payments crises or other
traumatic events associated with the exchange rate regime.
The suspension of the gold standard in 1914 was the direct result of the outbreak of World
War I in August, 1914. Within a few months of the outbreak of war (indeed in some cases even
before the formal declaration), most countries had suspended gold payments either de jure or de
facto (Brown (1940), pp.7-26). When the war ended, most countries had experienced such rapid
inflation during the previous four years that an immediate return to convertilibity at anything like
the pre-war parities was unthinkable. It was the announced aim of virtually all countries, however,
to return to the gold standard quickly, and a great deal of macroeconomic history of the subsequent
period can only be understood in this light.10
The correct characterization of the system of international monetary arrangements varies con-
siderably over the 1914-1933 period. During the War the major currencies floated relative to one
another, but there were sufficient controls on prices, gold movements, and international capital
sSee also the papers in Bordo and Schwartz (1984) for detailed discussions of the features of a goldl standard.
9 China, El Salvador, and Honduras maintained silver standards during this period (Eichengreen (1985), p.6).
10 See, for example the First Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee (1918) in Britain. Keynes (1923) was an
outspoken opponent of the return to gold.
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flows that any attempt to describe the system in simple terms is bound to be inaccurate. The
period from 1919-1925 appears to be a relatively clean case of floating rates. From 1926-31, several
countries resumed convertibility, so that the world moved back toward a gold standard. It appears
to be the consensus, however, that the operation of the gold standard during this period did not
approximate its smooth operation before 1914. Beginning with Britain's devaluation of sterling in
the fall of 1931, a number of countries left the gold standard, this time for good. The final blow
to the international gold standard was the departure of the United States in 1933 (Eichengreen
(1985), pp.19-24).
III. Evidence of the Changes in the Behavior of Interest Rates and Prices
In this section we document the changes in the behavior of nominal interest rates and inflation
rates that occurred after 1914. We present results for two countries, the United States and Britain.
These two countries, at least as of the second period, were the world's major economic powers, and
New York and London were its key financial centers. In addition, there are consistent data series
for these two countries. To the extent that there are data for other countries, they confirm the
main results presented below.1 1 We examine the behavior of financial markets in both countries
for two periods (1890-1910 and 1920-1933) that do not overlap either the founding of the Fed or
World War 1.12 The objective is to document the change in regime in a way that avoids problems
of how the transition took place.
All our data series are monthly. The nominal interest rate series for the United States consists
of observations from the first week of each month on the three month time loan rate available at
New York City banks.1 3 The nominal rate series for Britain consists of observations from the first
week of the month on the three month rate on bankers' bills available in London, as reported in the
Economist.1 4 The price series for the United States is the Wholesale Price Index for all commodities
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The numbers are averages of observations collected
throughout the month. The price series for Britain is an index of the wholesale prices of 45
commodities, developed by Augustus Saurbeck and continued after his death by the Statist.15 It
11 See especially Clark (1986) and Morgenstern (1959). Clark shows that interest rate seasonality diminished
substantially after 1914 in France and Germany, as well as in the United States and Britain. Morgenstern
notes that the seasonality of financial variables diminished significantly in all four countries.
12 Our results are essentially unchanged if we omit the years 1929-1933 from the second sample period.
13 The series is described more fully in Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987).
14 This is the open market rate on bankers' bills, not the Bank of England's discount rate, known as Bank Rate.
'" See the Economic Journal, 1886, p.592 and p.648 for detalls on the construction of the index.
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is (purportedly) measured during the last week of each month. We have shifted this series forward
one month in all of the calculations reported below, so it is only one week out of alignment with
our interest rate series.
Table 1 shows the autocorrelation function for the nominal interest rate in the United States
and Britain for the two different sample periods. In both countries the short rate was mean reverting
during the 1890-1910 period. The autocorrelations of the level of rates damp quickly, and the first
differences show significant negative autocorrelation. In the 1920-1933 period, the autocorrelations
die out less quickly, and there is less evidence of autocorrelation in the first differences. In the first
sample the autocorrelations indicate that the short rate is more persistent in Britain than it is in
the United States. In the second sample, the autocorrelation functions are almost identical.
In Table 2 we show regressions of the short rate on its own lagged values, including and
excluding seasonal dummies. These results confirm those in Table 1. In the early period, the
coefficient on the lagged short rate is significantly less than one in both countries, and there is
quantitatively important evidence of seasonality. In the later period, the coefficient on the lagged
short rate is not significantly different from one and there is much less evidence of seasonality. In
both countries, the short-term nominal interest rate became approximately a random walk.
In Figures 1 and 2 we display estimates of the seasonal pattern in short rates for both countries
and sample periods. The seasonal patterns were calculated by regressing the short rate on seasonal
dummies only, with the coefficients constrained to change smoothly from one month to the next.
Specifically, we regressed the short rate on lags one through twelve of the seasonal dummy for
January, with the coefficients constrained to follow a fifth order polynominal distributed lag. The
figures present the differences of the twelve coefficients from the average coefficient.
The pattern of seasonality is similar in timing across countries. Rates were high in the fall,
especially November, and low in the summer, particularly July. The amplitude of the seasonal
pattern is also similar, approximately 200 basis points (at an annual rate) in both countries. The
seasonal pattern is statistically significant in both countries in both sample periods, but in the later
sample period the amplitude of the seasonal patterns is much smaller. Tests of the hypothesis that
the seasonal patterns are the same before and after 1914 reject the null at the 1% level for both
the United States and Britain.16
16 The hypothesis tests were carried out on the seasonal dummy coefficients in the change in the short rate
because the level is probaibly non-stationary in the second sample period. The tests were performed on the OLS
estimates of seasonal dummy coefficients, with the standard errors corrected using the Hansen and liodrick
(1980) procedure (as modified by Newey and West (1987)). The lag length used to calculate the variance-
covariance matrix was 12.
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The next question we address is whether the changes in the behavior of nominal interest rates
coincide with changes in the behavior of inflation rates. Tables 3 and 4 present results for the one
month inflation rate analogous to those in Tables 1 and 2 for the nominal interest rate.
During the early sample period, the autocorrelation function in the United States shows sig-
nificant correlation at the first lag but little at any other lag. This is exactly the result we would
expect if the true inflation process were white noise in continuous time but we employed time
averaged price level data to compute the inflation rates (Working (1960)). For the United States
the price level data are averages over a month, so our results are consistent with a white noise
process for the inflation rate. In Britain, there is stronger first order autocorrelation during the
early sample period, and several of the higher order autocorrelations are significant. Also, the price
data for Britain are allegedly from the last week of each month, so the time-average bias should
not be severe. The results therefore indicate some positive serial correlation in the inflation rate
for Britain. In the post-1914 sample period there is modest but clearly significant persistence in
the inflation rate in both countries.
The regression results tell essentially the same story as the autocorrelations. In the United
States there is little indication of persistence in the inflation rate in the early sample period but clear
evidence of such persistence in the later sample. In Britain, there is some indication of persistence
in the first sample and modest but significant persistence in the later sample.
We display estimates of the seasonal patterns in inflation rates in Figures 3 and 4.17 The
estimates indicate substantial seasonality in the inflation rate in both countries in both time periods:
the amplitude of the seasonal is at least 800 basis points in every sample and more than 2000 basis
points in the later samples. The seasonal in the inflation rate is significantly different from zero in
all four samples. Although the point estimates suggest that there are significant differences in the
seasonal patterns across sample periods, tests of the hypothesis of no change fail to reject the null
at even the 35% level for either country.18
The results presented above clearly delineate the change in the stochastic processes for interest
rates and prices. In both countries there is increased persistence in both the short term nominal
interest rate and the inflation rate, and there is markedly decreased seasonality in the nominal rate.
One cannot determine whether there are significant changes in the seasonal patterns in inflation
17 These were calculated by regressing the inflation rates on seasonal dummies whose coefficients were constained
to follow a fifth order polynomial, as above.
18 The test statistics refer to OLS estimates of the seasonal dummy coefficients, with standard errors computed
using the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) procedure.
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rates. Although the changes that occur in both variables are qualitatively similar across countries,
the changes are more pronounced in the United States.
IV. A Model of Policy Interaction Under a Gold Standard
The traditional explanation of the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices in the
United States is that the changes were due to the founding of the Federal Reserve System. Certainly
a reader of contemporary periodicals would be drawn to this explanation. As we have discussed,
the Fed was created primarily to stabilize interest rates and credit markets, so it should not be
surprising that interest rates tabilized after its founding. The fact that the change in the behavior
of interest rates and prices occurred worldwide, however, calls this traditional explanation into
question. One might also make the a priori argument that under a fixed exchange rate system,
as existed before 1914, the existence of the Fed should be irrelevant. Under fixed exchanges rates,
international arbitrage should equate nominal interest rates throughout the world. Therefore, the
introduction of a single central bank, such as the Federal Reserve, should have at most minimal
effects on interest rates or prices.
The assertion that the Fed could not have been responsible for the changes in the behavior of
interest rates and prices obviously raises the question of what did cause these changes. The most
obvious alternative explanation is that the change were caused by the breakdown of the classical
gold standard and the fixed exchange rate system at the beginning of World War I. Indeed, it might
seem difficult to make an affirmative case for the position that the breakdown of the classical gold
standard was not relevent to the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices.
The purpose of this section is to make theoretically plausible the position that the Fed could
have been the cause of the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices. We consider a
historical counterfactual. In particular, we argue that the founding of the Fed might have led to
the changed behavior of interest rates and prices, even if World War I and the breakdown of the
classical gold standard had not occurred. Of course, no purely theoretical discussion can preclude a
possibly important role for the destruction of the gold standard in causing the changes in finanical
markets. Theory can, however, overturn the presumption that the changes could not have been
due to the Fed. We turn in Section V to an evaluation of the part played by each of these two
events in bringing about the observed changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices.
A. The Set- Up of the Model
We propose a simple model in which exchange rates are fixed and in which the introduction
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of a single central bank might have worldwide implications for interest rates and prices.19 The
model is highly stylized. It assumes perfect capital markets, perfect purchasing power parity, and
a complete dichotomy between real and monetary phenomena. These assumptions are probably
incorrect and perhaps patently false. We nonetheless believe the model is useful as an illustration
of some of the forces that might have been at work. In particular, the model allows us to show that
the introduction of a central bank in one country might have worldwide implications.
Consider a world of two identical countries operating under fixed exchange rates. Each country
wishes to stabilize its nominal interest rate and to avoid international gold flows. When there is
a central bank in only one country, it is impossible for that central bank to both stabilize interest
rates and avoid gold flows. Hence, that bank must tradeoff the two goals. Once the second country
introduces a central bank, both banks can together stabilize interest rates without generating
undesirable gold flows. This equilibrium with two central banks achieves the first-best monetary
policy, even in the absence of coordination.
In each country, the demand for money is given by the simple quantity equation:
Mt* = Pt*
where M is the country's quantity of money, P is the price of goods in terms of money, and a star
denotes a foreign country variable. Because we assume purchasing power parity, P = P*.
The supply of money is assumed to consist of monetary gold and fiduciary money-that is,
money printed by the central bank that is (in principle) convertible into gold and thus trades
one-for-one with gold. The world supply of money is
Mt + Mt* = Mt-1 + Mt*-1 + X t + X*
where X is the quantity of new fiduciary money printed. We assume that the bank changes the
quantity of fiduciary money within sufficiently narrow bounds that the maintenance of the gold
standard is not threatened.20
There is an exogenous real interest rate, rt, that is common across countries. The nominal
rate, it, is
19 A similar model is presented in Eichengreen (1984). That model does not focus on interest rate stabilization,
however.
20 See Shiller and Seigel (1977) on the Bank of England.
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where ire is the world inflation rate. From the simple money demand equations, we know
7 =Mt - Mt_1 Mt* - Mt*_1I
Mt- 1  _ M- 1
The rate of inflation equals the rate of money growth in each country.
The central banks have two objectives: to achieve a nominal interest rate target and to avoid




* Mt*_ 1 + Xt* - Mt*






The quantities ft and fj* are the percentage net outflows of gold between the two countries, while
the quantities Xj and z4 are the percentage production of new fidiciary money.
The choice variables for the two central banks can be viewed as x and x*. Straightforward
algebra verifies that
"1
it = rt + -i(e +4x*)
and
ft =-f* = -(zt-*)
2
The first equation says that the nominal interest rate depends on the exogenous real interest rate
and the average rate of money creation in the two countries. The second equation says that the
amount of gold flow between the two countries depends on the difference between the amounts of
money creation.
B. The Solution with One Central Bank
Consider first the situation in which only the home country has a central bank. In this case,
z*= 0. The home country has one choice variable, x, which affects both the interest rate i and the
amount of gold flow f.
Suppose the objective of the central bank is to minimize
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That is, the central bank dislikes gold flows, and would like to stick close to a target nominal






Minimizing V subject to these constraints yields
2
Xt = -(it - rt)
ft = y- t-rt)
1+ 41 -
fe= --- t - r
1+4 1+#)
Note that for large 4, the central bank embarks on no policy at all, since doing so generates highly
undesirable gold flows. In this limiting case, the nominal interest rate simply equals the exogenous
real interest rate.
C. The Solution with Two Central Banks
Consider now a situation with two central banks. Each central bank has the same objective
function and takes the other central bank's creation of money (x or x*) as given. Thus, we are
solving for the Nash equilibrium of the policy game. (Given the assumed commonality of objectives,
the game-theoretic aspects are not of great interest.)
The home country's reaction function, determined by choosing x to minimize V for a given
x*, is
2 4-1,
Xt = -- (it - rt)+ 4)-i
and the foreign country's reaction function is
x* = (se -rt) + ze
1+ 4-1
The Nash equilibrium is therefore
ze= 4[ = it- rt
21 The bank dislikes gold outflows because they threaten the bank's ability to maintain convertibility. It dislikes
gold inflows (probably to a lesser degree) because of the resource cost of holding an excessive quantity of reserves
and because the accumulation of gold by the home central bank implies a greater likelihood of a convertibility
crisis in some other country. See Mankiw (1987) for an optimal tax justification of the bank's nominal interest
rate target.
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and the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are
ft = 0
Thus, in the equilibrium with two central banks, there are no gold flows, and the nominal interest
rate always equals its target.22
D. Discussion
At the broad brush level, the model outlined above provides a basis for attributing the changes
in the behavior of interest rates and prices to the founding of the Federal Reserve, rather than to
the dissolution of the gold standard. With this model as background, we can interpret the historical
events in the following way. Before 1914, all countries had both an interest rate target and a desire
to minimize gold flows. Because the United States had no central bank, however, and because
most countries with central banks placed significant weight on their desire to prevent gold flows, it
was not optimal for any central bank to attempt to smooth its country's interest rate. After 1914,
when the Fed was introduced, it was desirable for each central bank to stabilize rates, knowing that
all other banks would do likewise. As a result, interest rates were stabilized. This explanation of
the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices gives no role to the destruction of the gold
standard. The explanation also provides a basis for believing that the founders of the Fed were
rational in thinking that the introduction of the Fed would stabilize interest rates in the United
States, even if the world continued to operate on a gold standard.
V. What Was Responsible: The Fed or the Gold Standard?
One implication of the line of reasoning in the last section is that the dissolution of the gold
standard and the founding of the Federal Reserve might have been, to some extent, hypothetical
substitutes. Both would tend to have the effect of removing the need to avoid gold flows as a dom-
inant objective of monetary policy, allowing the domestic consideration of interest rate smoothing
to come to the forefront. The counterfactual that we entertained in our theoretical example of
policy coordination imagined the operation of the Federal Reserve, in addition to other countries'
central banks, within the context of a continuing gold standard. We concluded that interest rate
stabilization in each country would have been an admissible equilibrium outcome in that scenario.
22 With an arbitrary nominal interest peg, it, the implied inflation rate rnay not be cornpatible with the long run
maintenance of the gold standard. The time subscript indicates that the central bank periodically revises its
interest rate target with this consideration in mind. Even though the bank cannot set the long run nominal
rate arbitrarily, however, it can still offset seasonal and other transitory disturbances.
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A second counterfactual worth entertaining is to suppose that the gold standard had been
suspended, but no Federal Reserve had been established. Although the freedom from international
constraints regarding gold flows would certainly have been achieved, it is by no means clear how,
in the absence of a central bank, the United States could have taken advantage of this freedom to
stabilize interest rates. We are not aware of a well-articulated story in which the dissolution of a
gold standard, in and of itself, would lead to smoothed interest rates. This observation makes us
suspicious that the break with gold, unaccompanied by the introduction of the Fed, would have
done-the job. However, some more concrete evidence on the roles of the two historical events is
needed. In this section we present information that allows us to evaluate whether the Fed or the
destruction of the gold standard was more likely responsible for the changes in financial markets.
Before turning to that evidence, we address briefly the issue of whether World War I per se,
or some other unspecificed event, might have been responsible for the changes in the behavior of
interest rates and prices. We note first that the changes we have documented above appear to
have occurred well before 1920. When we compute results for the period 1915-1918, we find that
this period appears qualitatively much more like the 1920-1933 period than like the 1890-1910
period. The changes that occurred in financial markets were clearly present during World War I
and continued, in even more dramatic form, after the end of the War. This indicates that the War
in and of itself was not the source of the changes. As a second piece of evidence that either the Fed
or the gold standard was responsible for the changes, we have examined the switching regressions
analogous to those in Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) that allow us to date the most likely point of
the changes in the stochastic processes. We find that for both interest rates and inflation the switch
occured with high probability sometime between the middle of 1914 and the middle of 1915 in both
the United States and Britain. Thus, the results support the notion that either the dismantling
of the gold standard or the founding of the Fed, rather than some other unspecified event, was
responsible for the changes observed in the stochastic behavior of interest rates and prices.2 3
We now turn to evaluating the roles of the two major changes in institutions. Our first piece
of evidence comes from examining a different historical example of a switch from fixed to flexible
exchange rates. Tables 5 and 6 present autocorrelations of the short rate and the inflation rate for
the sample periods 1957-1969 and 1974-1984. The first sample period ends before the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods fixed rate regime while the second begins after intitiation of the current flexible
23 As far as distinguishing between these two possibilities, however, we find the results of such dating to be
inconclusive. The two events simply occured too close together for this approach to produce conclusive results.
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rate period.24
The results allow us to make two points. First, seasonal or other transitory variation in interest
rates did not return in either country when the world returned to a system of fixed exchange
rates. The 1957-69 period exhibits essentially none of the mean reverting variation in interest rates
displayed by the 1890-1910 period. Second, the change from fixed to flexible rates in the early
1970's was accompanied by at most minor changes in the persistence of interest rates in each of the
two countries.25 If the exchange rate regime rather than the Fed was the key consideration in 1914,
we would expect to see some signs of similar changes in the interest rate process accompanying the
inception and demise of the Bretton Woods regime
The evidence on inflation shows that the degree of persistence during the Bretton Woods
period is more like the pre-Fed period than the 1920-33 period. Also, the increased persistence of
inflation at the demise of Bretton Woods mimics the increased persistence after 1914 and is thus
more suggestive of the importance of the exchange rate regime than is the evidence from interest
rates. It is worth noting that for both the 1957-1969 and 1974-1984 periods the autcorrelations in
the WPI inflation rate reported here are noticeably lower than those using the CPI inflation rate
(Barsky (1987)).
The second and perhaps more important piece of evidence on the relative role of the Fed and
the exchange rate regime appears in Tables 7 and 8, which show the correlations across countries
in price levels, inflation rates, the level of interest rates, and changes in interest rates for the
pre-1914 and post-1914 sample periods. To a first approximation, there is little change in these
cross-country correlations across sample periods. If anything, inflation rates show more correlation
across countries in the flexible rate period, contrary to the usual expectation based on purchasing
power parity considerations.
If we ask what contribution the suspension of a gold standard could have made to interest rate
stabilization, it appears that any answer must involve a freeing of domestic interest rates and price
levels from the international constraints posed by fixed exchange rates. Yet the breakdown of the
gold standard in 1914 was not accompanied by an observed change in the international linkages of
prices and interest rates. Of course, these cross-country correlations are properties of reduced form
24 The data series that we use for these calculations are monthly observations on the three month United States
and British Treasury bill rates (both taken from the first week of each month) and monthly observations on
the United States and British WPI's. We begin the early sample period in 1957 because that is when WPI
data for Britain are first available.
25 There are clear increases in the volatility of the change in interest rates, in contrast to the results for 1914.
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relationships, and it is possible that two very different structures could have lead to similar reduced
form observations. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the data to suggest that the within-country
changes in prices and interest rates were the result of any reduction in international linkages of
interest rates and prices associated with the switch in the exchange rate regime.
In Tables 9 and 10 we present the correlations across countries for the Bretton Woods and
recent flexible exchange rate periods. There is no evidence that the change in exchange rate regime
coincided with a change in the extent to which interest rates and prices move together, confirming
the results in Mankiw (1986). This surprising finding warrants investigation in future work.
VI. The Behavior of Real Interest Rates Before and After 1914
Any discussion of interest rate stabilization would be incomplete without asking whether the
stabilization of the nominal rate was accompanied by a change in the process followed by real
rates. We take up this question now. We focus on the seasonal movements in real rates because
seasonality is an identifiable source of predictable variation in the nominal rate prior to 1914 that is
clearly absent in the second sample period. As noted by Shiller (1980), the question thus becomes
whether the disappearance of the seasonal in nominal rates was offset by a change in the inflation
seasonal so that the seasonal pattern of the underlying expected real rate remained invariant.
We follow the procedure of regressing ex post real rates on twelve dummies for the periods
1980-1910 and 1920-1933.26 As Mishkin (1981) shows, this procedure provides consistent estimates
of the seasonal in the ex ante real rate. Since unanticipated inflation adds noise, however, this
seasonal pattern will be estimated less precisely than if we had direct measures of the expected
real rate. There is a significant real rate seasonal at the 10% (but not the 5%) level for both
countries in the earlier period. The later periods shows no statistically significant evidence of a real
rate seasonal in either country, suggesting that there might have been a significant change in the
seasonal in the real rate process. Tests of the hypothesis of no change, however, do not reject the
null at any conventional significance level. We are forced to conclude, along with Shiller (1980),
that the data do not allow any convincing inference about the change in the behavior of real rates.
Our results do make the conclusion stated in Shiller (1980) more convincing. Shiller employs
an interest rate series of questionable reliability (the 4-6 month cornmercial paper rate), and he
merely examines plots of estimated seasonal patterns without cai-rying out hypothesis tests. In
addition, the definition of seasonality that he employs (Census X-11) is inappropriate since the
26 Again, the standard errors are comnputed using the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) procedure.
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seasonal coefficients produced by this technique for any particular year are functions of the data for
both sample periods. We have used a more accurate data series and a more appropriate statistical
technique, in addition to computing results for an additional country. Thus, although our conclusion
is identical to Shiller's, our evidence should help remove any residual doubt about the validity of
his conclusion.
VII. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate the role of two major institutional changes in
contributing to observed changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices after 1914. The paper's
contribution lies in showing that the simultaneity of the changes in the processes for interest rates
and prices in many countries does not, by itself, prove that the changes were due to the destruction
of the gold standard rather than to the founding of the Fed. Our model of policy coordination
provides an example in which the introduction of the Fed leads to a stabilization of interest rates,
even if the gold standard remains intact, and our empirical evidence suggests that the gold standard
did not play a crucial role in precipitating the changes in interest rate behavior.
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Table 1: Autocorrelations of the Short Rate
United States Britain
1890-1910 1920-1933 1890-1910 1920-1933
Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change
First .75 -.19 .96 .02 .84 -.04 .95 .06
Second .61 .12 .92 .05 .68 -.11 .89 .14
Third .40 -.20 .86 -.10 .57 -.05 .82 .04
Fourth .29 -.05 .81 .09 .48 -.18 .74 .03
Fifth .20 -.06 .76 .10 .45 -.02 .66 -.07
Sixth .14 -.09 .70 .06 .42 .01 .58 -.02
Seventh .12 -.02 .64 -.03 .39 -.13 .50 -.15
Eighth .11 -.09 .58 .01 .38 -.13 .44 -.02
Ninth .13 .02 .52 -.10 .42 .02 .37 -.00
Tenth .15 -.00 .48 .02 .45 .10 .31 -.05
Eleventh .17 .06 .42 -.03 .45 -.01 .25 .00
Twelfth .15 .15 .37 .03 .45 .18 .19 -.04
Std. Dev. 1.53 1.07 2.11 .52 1125 .70 1.61 .45
Note: The approximate standard errors for the autocorrelations (under the null that the series is
white noise) are 0.06 for the 1890-1910 sample and 0.08 for the 1920-1933 sample.
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Autocorrelations of the One Month Inflation Rate
United States Britain
1890-1910 1920-1933 1890-1910 1920-1933
First .18 .65 .32 .46
Second .02 .56 .10 .28
Third .03 .38 .10 .17
Fourth -.00 .31 .05 .15
Fifth -.02 .13 .05 .10
Sixth -.02 .07 .02 .09
Seventh -.04 -.00 .02 .06
Eighth .05 -.04 .15 .09
Ninth .02 -.04 .13 .12
Tenth -.03 -.00 -.03 .15
Eleventh -.02 .04 .01 .08
Twelfth -.09 -.04 -.02 -.09
Std.Dev. 18.95 23.08 12.02 25.47
Note: The approximate standard errors for the autocorrelations (under the null that the series is
white noise) are 0.06 for the 1890-1910 sample and 0.08 for the 1920-1933 sample.
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Table 4: Regressions of hiflation Rate on Lagged Irba ion Rate| United States JBritain


















































































































































Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Autocorrelations of the Short Rate
United States Britain
1957-1969 1974-1984 1957-1969 1974-1984
Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change
First .95 .21 .95 .09 .94 .11 .94 .11
Second .90 .05 .87 -.09 .86 .04 .87 .13
Third .84 .15 .84 -.05 .78 -.09 .79 -.04
Fourth .78 -.04 .79 -.14 .71 .01 .71 -.12
Fifth .72 -.07 .76 .01 .64 .05 .65 .12
Sixth .67 -.06 .72 -.19 .56 -.07 .57 .01
Seventh .63 -.27 .71 -.15 .49 -.14 .49 -.03
Eighth .60 -.11 .71 .15 .43 -.24 .42 -.09
Ninth .58 .02 .70 .08 .40 -.10 .35 .00
Tenth .55 -.10 .68 .10 .38 -.10 .28 -.22
Eleventh .53 -.01 .64 .10 .38 -.04 .24 -.03
Twelfth .50 .11 .60 -.21 .38 .03 .20 -.04
Std. Dev. 1.32 .27 2.95 .95 1.38 .44 2.53 .84
Table 6: Autocorrelations of the One Month Inflation Rate
United States Britain
1957-1969 1974-1984 1957-1969 1974-1984
First .17 .44 -.15 .58
Second .13 .28 .11 .53
Third -.12 .43 .15 .48
Fourth .08 .13 .02 .40
Fifth .09 .23 .09 .33
Sixth .19 .24 .01. .39
Seventh .01 .02 .09 .28
Eighth .07 .12 .02 .32
Ninth .09 .26 -.02 .36
Tenth .18 .14 .06 .29
Eleventh .05 .19 .05 .35
Twelfth .12 .26 .07 .40
Std. Dev. 3.76 8.35 4.62 7.35
Note: The approximate standard errors for the autocorrelations (under the null that the series is
white noise) are .08 for the 1957-1969 sample and 0.09 for the 1974-1984 sample.
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Table 7: Correlations Across Countries in Interest Rates
1890-1910 1920-1933
Level .627 .790
One Month Change .311 .162
Three Month Change .545 .375
Six Month Change .650 .554
Table 8: Correlations Across Countries in Prices
1890-1910 1920-1933
Price Level .870 .943
One Month Inflation .347 .447
Three Month Inflation .539 .626
Six Month Inflation .540 .687
Table 9: Correlations Across Countries in Interest Rates
1957-1969 1974-1984
Level .651 .544
One Month Change .018 .071
Three Month Change .075 .152
Six Month Change .041 .176
Table 10: Correlations Across Countries in Prices
1957-1969 1974-1984
Price Level .911 .986
One Month Inflation .080 .263
Three Month Inflation .297 .308
Six Month Inflation .554 .328
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